Privileged in-game Lua laboratory

The bundled open77_debug resource provides ACL-controlled tools for client Lua, native diagnostics and the REDscript polling bridge.

This is intentionally not a public gameplay API. It is available only inside the bundled local open77_debug resource. A downloaded server resource cannot enable it by adding a permission to its manifest.

Source: open77_debug.

Admin command#

Run this from the in-game Open77 terminal or chat:

client.exec <playerId> <lua source>

The command is registered as restricted. The server checks the authenticated caller against ACL permission command.client.exec, sends the source to the one requested session ID, and correlates the reply with the original admin. The shipped acl.jsonc declares no principal at all ("principals": []), so nobody has access until one is added; a principal holding "permissions": ["*"] does grant it. See Server ACL.

Examples:

client.exec 1 return 6 * 7
client.exec 1 return Open77.character.state()
client.exec 1 return Open77.debug.command('vehicle.list')
client.exec 1 return Open77.debug.command('vehicle.status 4294967297')
client.exec 1 return Open77.debug.command('vehicle.glass 4294967297 windows_front_left')
client.exec 1 return Open77.debug.redscript('debug.trace:hello')

Use single quotes inside the Lua expression because the server command tokenizer reconstructs the source from the remaining whitespace-separated arguments.

When submitting through the external debug bridge, server_command_sent means the request was sent, not that the Lua finished. Read net.commands 10 for the correlated result_request response. If the Lua queues a resource event, also check that resource's completion log or state. Test RTTI in game shows this sequence with agent-play.ps1 and native lifetime counters.

Position and rotation clipboard commands#

Any authenticated player can copy their own live transform from chat:

/pos
/rot

/pos writes a reusable Lua field such as position = { x = -1442.200000, y = 127.400000, z = 18.000000 }. /rot writes the complete quaternion plus horizontal yaw. The server command targets the authenticated caller, while the downloaded open77_chat client reads the transform and writes the clipboard. The server receives a bounded success result but never sees prior clipboard contents. The result appears in chat and in a middle-left WebUI notification.

Ordinary client resources can use the same write-only API after declaring the permission:

permission "clipboard.write"

local ok, reason = Open77.clipboard.setText("text copied by my resource")

See the clipboard guide for limits, failure reasons, complete output formats, and the client/server routing model.

Client debug namespace#

Only open77_debug, on the trusted local host, can successfully call these functions:

local ok, result = Open77.debug.eval("return Open77.camera.view()", "camera-probe")
local ok, result = Open77.debug.command("vehicle.list")
local ok, result = Open77.debug.redscript("debug.trace:glass-probe")

• eval(source, label?) compiles a text-only Lua chunk in the existing open77_debug VM. Returned primitives and serializable tables are converted to bounded text.
• command(commandLine) calls the registered native laboratory table directly on the game thread. It does not forward unknown commands to the server. The vehicle laboratory is registered here, including vehicle.glass, vehicle.tire, vehicle.body, vehicle.part, and repair operations.
• redscript(command) queues an opaque command through Open77ScriptBridge.reds. REDscript polls and executes it from a genuine script frame. debug.trace:<text> is the initial observable probe; further debug.* handlers can be added on the REDscript side without changing the C++ bridge.

Safety and limits#

• ACL authorization happens before Lua source is dispatched.
• Execution is targeted, never broadcast.
• Source is limited to 32 KiB, result text to 8 KiB, and replies time out after 10 seconds.
• The updated client allows 96 MiB of Lua memory per resource, 1,500,000 instructions per resume, and a 6 ms frame budget shared by each client host. Older clients retain 32 MiB / 500,000 / 2 ms; see runtime quotas. Infinite loops fail with Open77 script execution budget exceeded.
• The normal sandbox remains intact: no io, os, debug, package, load, bytecode, filesystem escape, raw REDengine pointer, or foreign resource global is exposed.
• The server-distributed copy of open77_debug is excluded from the downloaded client host. Its server script still registers client.exec; only the trusted bundled client copy evaluates it.

Keep debug.runtime out of ordinary resource manifests. If a deployment should not expose this laboratory at all, remove open77_debug from the server resource set or remove command.client.exec from every ACL principal.